Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1999

J. Kent Curtis, Bonnie L. Curtis, John H. Wilcox
and Kathleen Wilcox v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange, and John Paris : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Daniel F. Bertch; Kevin K. Robson; Bertch & Birch; Attorneys for Appellants.
Aaron Alma Nelson; Hanson Nelson Chipman Quigley; Attorney for Appellees.
Aaron Alma Nelson (2379) HANSON NELSON CHIPMAN QUIGLEY 215 South State Street,
Suite 800 Salt Lake City, UT 84111 Attorney for Appellees
Daniel F. Bertch (4728) Kevin K. Robson (6976) BERTCH & BIRCH 5296 S. Commerce Drive,
Suite 100 Salt Lake City, UT 84107 Attorneys for Appellants
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Curtis v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, No. 990058 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2010

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

o I M H COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE S T ^ T E ^ F UTAH

VIO
XMET NO.

l^ooff

J. KENT CURTIS, BONNIE L. CURTIS,
JOHN H. WILCOX and KATHLEEN
WILCOX,
Case No. 990058 CA
Plaintiffs,
Priority No. 15
v.
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, and
JOHN PARIS,
Defendants.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third District Court, Salt Lake County
Hon. Douglas Cornaby, sitting for Hon. Roger A. Livingston

Daniel F. Bertch (4728)
Kevin K. Robson (6976)
BERTCH & BIRCH
5296 S. Commerce Drive, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Attorneys for Appellants

Aaron Alma Nelson (2379)
HANSON NELSON CHIPMAN QUIGLEY
215 South State Street, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Appellees

FILED
AUfi t f •» H9
COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

J. KENT CURTIS, BONNIE L. CURTIS,
JOHN H. WILCOX and KATHLEEN
WILCOX,
Case No. 990058 CA
Plaintiffs,
Priority No. 15
v.
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, and
JOHN PARIS,
Defendants.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third District Court, Salt Lake County
Hon. Douglas Cornaby, sitting for Hon. Roger A. Livingston

Daniel F. Bertch (4728)
Kevin K. Robson (6976)
BERTCH & BIRCH
5296 S. Commerce Drive, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Attorneys for Appellants

Aaron Alma Nelson (2379)
HANSON NELSON CHIPMAN QUIGLEY
215 South State Street, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Appellees

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

4

DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
4
POINT ONE
4
THE INSURANCE APPLICATION AND POLICY SHOULD BE CONSTRUED
TOGETHER TO DETERMINE THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES
4
POINT TWO
5
FARMERS SHOULD BE ESTOPPED TO REFUSE PROVIDING THE
COVERAGE SET FORTH IN THE INSURANCE APPLICATION
6
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

8

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Allen v. Prud. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992)

6, 7

Cullum v. Farmers Ins. Exck, 857 P.2d 922 (Utah 1993)

5

Perkins v. Great-West Life Assurance Co., 814 P.2d 1125 (Utah App. 1991)

6

U.S.F.&G. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993)

5

Statutes
U.C.A. §31A-21-105(l)(a) (1986)

4

U.C.A. §31A-21-106 (1986)

4

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
An insurance application and the resulting policy must be considered together to determine
the intent of the parties. If the policy delivered by the insurer varies from the signed application, the
insurer should be bound by the representations in the application. In this case, the application
referred to insurance for "all perils", a legal term of art in the insurance field which refers to
coverage for all risks or perils not caused by the insured's fraud. However, the policy only covered
certain specifically listed perils, and was not an all perils policy. The listed perils did not include
snow damage to the Insureds' cabin. Because the insurance application must be considered with the
policy to determine the intent of the parties, the trial court should have found coverage, or at least
an ambiguity in they type of insurance that Farmers had agreed to provide.
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE INSURANCE APPLICATION AND POLICY
SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TOGETHER TO
DETERMINE THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES
Farmers apparently concedes that U.C.A. §31A-21-105(l)(a) (1986) binds the insurer to a
statement or representation in the application for insurance. Despite admitting that it is bound to any
statement in the application, Farmers argues that the application is only considered as part of the
contract if it is attached to the policy when delivered to the insured. This completely misreads U. C.A.
§31A-21-106 (1986). That statute creates three sources for the terms of the insurance contract: 1)
the policy, 2) the application, 3) any other document attached to the policy. The phrase "attached
to the policy" only modifies the third category, of other documents not a part of the policy or the
application. To hold otherwise would create an inconsistency between §31A-21-105 and §31A-214

106 (1986). Statutes are construed in a manner to eliminate inconsistency rather than to create
inconsistency.
Farmers also overlooks U.SF.&G. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993), where the Utah
Supreme Court expressly looked to the insurance application to determine the amount of coverage
the insured was purchasing. The Court there stated:
A reasonable purchaser of insurance could surely read the USF & G policy to provide
$300,000 coverage in excess of public liability insurance coverage. The application
for insurance (a request for policy change in this case) stated that the
underinsured motorist coverage was $300,000 each accident. At the beginning of
the section [of the application] on underinsured motorist coverage is a blank for the
insertion of the dollar amount for the limit of liability for "each accident". That
section's language indicates that the insured has a fixed maximum dollar amount of
coverage.
Id. at 523, emphasis added. The Sandt court then went on to compare the application language above
with the insurance contract itself, and concluded there was an ambiguity. The critical point is that
the Sandt court expressly referred to the insurance application as part of the overall insurance
contract with the insurer. The trial court, however, refused to consider the policy as having any
bearing on the intent of the parties to this insurance contract. This was a clear legal error.
Farmers trots out the case of Cullum v. Farmers Ins. Exch, 857 P.2d 922 (Utah 1993) in
support of its argument. But Cullum did not involve a statement in the application for insurance
setting forth what the policy limits would be. Cullum would truly be analogous if the Cullum
insureds had requested $100,000.00 in insurance, but Farmers only issued a policy for $25,000.00,
the statutory minimum. In that situation, one would hope that this court would easily conclude that
the Cullum insureds would be entitled to the full coverage set forth in the application.
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POINT TWO
FARMERS SHOULD BE ESTOPPED TO REFUSE PROVIDING THE
COVERAGE SET FORTH IN THE INSURANCE APPLICATION
In Allen v. Prud. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992) the court recognized that
traditional contract doctrines such as estoppel would still be needed to fill in the gaps between
legislative and executive regulation of insurance policies. This case simply calls for the application
of one of those traditional contract doctrines, that of estoppel. In the application, printed by Farmers,
it created an impression that it was selling "all perils" insurance. The insureds expressly relied upon
that application and the impression that they were being offered "all perils" insurance. Having
created that impression by their own written application, Farmers should now be estopped to argue
that the policy is not so broad. The case of Perkins v. Great- West Life Assurance Co., 814 P.2d 1125
(Utah App. 1991) only held that a party could not rely upon a course of conduct in paying claims to
create estop the insurer from relying upon the written expression of the parties' intent. Where the
insurer has indicated in writing what the contract will consist of, the court should estop the insurer
from doing otherwise.
Farmers also makes a factual argument that the Insureds were unreasonable as a matter of law
in relying upon the insurance application as opposed to the policy. Questions of reasonableness are
ordinarily left up to a jury, who might well beg to differ with Farmers' counsel on that point.
CONCLUSION
To adopt Farmers' rule would completely negate the intent of the parties as expressed in the
insurance application, which is a contract in and of itself. It would allow insurers to substitute
insurance with less coverage than is agreed to in the application, so long as the application is not
physically attached to the policy. It would relegate insurance purchasers to a sort of third-class
6

consumer world, where "bait and switch" is judicially condoned, leaving insurance purchasers with
less protection than consumers of any other good or service. Requiring insurers to comply with the
written terms of an insurance application only promotes honesty and fair dealing between insurers
and prospective insureds.
For these reasons, the court should construe the application with the policy and any
attachments to the policy in determining the intent of the parties. The insureds are not suggesting that
the court go beyond the written expressions of the parties' intent, to create a new contract out of
whole cloth based upon the insureds' reasonable expectations. The insureds only ask this court to
enforce the Allen rule, by requiring the insurer to live up to the complete written transaction between
the parties, including the application.
DATED this 16th day of August, 1999.

Daniel F. Bertch
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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